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We consider a variety of two person perfect information games of the following 
sort. On the ith round Player I selects a vector vi of a certain prescribed form 
and Player II either adds or subtracts vi from a cumulative sum. Player II’s object 
is to keep the cumulative sum as small as possible. We give bounds on the value 
of such games under a variety of conditions. 
This paper considers a variety of two person perfect information games. 
In each game Player I selects vectors vi E R” (k is fixed for the game) and 
Player II selects Ei = il. Player 11 tries to minimize the sums st = 
ElVl + ... + EtVt . 
Notation. Let 
x == (xl ,..., x,J E R’<, 
Throughout this paper 
GAME 1. Fix k, n. There are n rounds. On the ith round Player I selects 
Vi E R”. 1 vi 1 -5 1. Then Player 11 selects ci = fl. The payoff (all payoffs 
in this paper are assummed to go to Player I) is maxlCtsn j st /. 
THEOREM 1. The tialue of GAME I is n112. 
Player I can assure himself this value by selecting vi , 1 vi [ = 1, vi per- 
pendicular to siel . Then, regardless of the choice of E< , 1 si I2 = 1 sip1 I2 + 
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1 = i by induction. Player II can assure herself this value by selecting l i 
such that civi . si-i < 0. Then 
so that 1 si j2 < i by induction. 
GAME 11. We play identically to GAME I except that / . 1 is replaced by 
11 . Ii throughout. That is, Player I must select vi E Rk so that I/ vi !/ < 1. The 
payoff is maxlsts, It St Il. 
Let f(n, k) denote the value of GAME II for given k, n. Theorem 2 bounds 
fh 4. 
THEOREM 2. (k - 1)1/2k-1/2n1/2 < f(n, k) -< [2 ln(2k)]1’2n1/2. 
Proof. We note 
II x/I < I x ! d ,‘a2 II x II for all x E Rk. (2) 
For the lower bound Player I selects vi , 11 vi I/ = 1, perpendicular to sip1 so 
as to maximize / vi 1. It is a simple exercise to see that vi may always be 
chosen with 1 vi I 3 (k - l)lj2. By induction I s, / > (k - 1)1/2n1/2 so that 
I/ s, 11 >, (k - l)112k-14z1/2. 
For an upper bound Player II may employ the strategy of Theorem 1 
givingf(n, k) < k1/2n1/2. For k 3 5 Player II does better with a more subtle 
strategy. Define a weight function 
where 
w(x) = t cosh(olxJ, x = (x1 )...( x3, 
i=l 
(II = [2 ln(2k)/n]li2. (3) 
Given stpl and vt Player II’s strategy is to select l t so as to minimize w(&). 
Let q-r = (St-1,1 ,..., St-& vt = (ql ,..., Z’tk), / % I < 1. Then 
n(st) = min[n(st-, + VJ, JV(st-i - Vt)l 
< [M'(St-1 + Vt) + dst-1 - VdlP 
= i [cosh(ol(St-.l.j + z?tJ) + cosh(ol(s,pl,i - qJ)]/2 
i=l 
= g1 cosh(q-,.i) cosh(olz’tJ 
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(by the identity [cosh(A + B) + cosh(/l - B)]/Z = cash A cash B) 
‘~ (cash ~) C COsh(crs,-,,i) 
2=1 
(as 1 o~L+~ 1 < 01 implies cosh(olc,,) < cash 01) 
= (cash a) n(st&. 
Initially s, = 0 so w(s,,) = k. Hence 
f: cosh(crs,,) = R&) < k(cosh a)” < k(cosh OI)~ 
i=l 
for all 0 < t < n. Employing the inequalities 
&e* ,< cash .X ,( e(1/2)z2 
valid for all real x we have 
so that 
$~ekisfi’ -( cosh(as,,) < i cosh(s,,) 
i=l 
,< k(cosh M)*~ < ke(1/2)U2n 
1 sti I < CL-~ ln(2k) + &n 
= [2 ln(2k)]1/2n1/2 
(by the judicious choice (3) of a) for all t, i, completing the proof. 
The exact value of Uk = limn-,Xc(n, k)~-l/~ appears elusive, even for 
k = 2. Even the existence of the limit Uk: has not been proven. We also 
cannot determine if lim,,, U,: = co, even if U, is defined in terms of lim sup 
or lim inf. 
Player II’s strategy in GAME II (in particular a) depends upon the total 
number of rounds n. GAME III is intended to simulate a situation in which 
Player II does not “know” n. 
GAME 111. The rules are identical with those of GAME II except there 
are an infinite number of rounds. The payoff is lim sup I( s (1 .-1/2. 
Let A, be the value of GAME III. 
THEOREM 3. (,k - l)llZk-1/2 < Al, ,( k1j2. 
The lower bound was given in the proof of Theorem 2. For the upper bound 
Player II selects E< so that c&-, . vi < 0. Now !/ v/j < 1 implies / v / < kl/? 
so that, by induction, 1 s, j < k1/2n1’2 and Ij s, // < 1 s, / < k*!2n1’2. 
BALANCING GAMES 71 
We find it somewhat counterintuitive that Player II appears aided by 
knowledge of the number of rounds n. 
2. BALANCING SETS OF VECTORS 
The game changes behavior completely if Player 1 must select all of his 
vectors vi before Player II selects her ci . Under most circumstances there is 
a finite upper bound to the value of the game that is independent of the 
number of rounds. We give our strongest result of this type. 
GAME IV. Player 1 selects an infinite sequence {vi}, i vi ; < 1, vi E R”‘. 
Player 11 then selects an infinite sequence (~~1, ci = &l. Payoff is supt 1 s( / 
THEOREM 4. GAME IV has a finite calue C = C, . That is, for all 
sc~quences (vi] there exists (E?) so that 1 si / < C for aN t. 
Proof: We use induction on k. Clearly C,= 1. We show Ckfl< (C, + 1 )Sl!*. 
Fix {vi], vi E R”‘+l, 1 vi / >< 1. The ci shall be chosen in blocks. Assume 
Ed ,..., et have been chosen so that 
!s*I <c,+ 1, 
1 Si 1 ,( (C, + 1)51’2, l<i<t. 
We shall either find an infinite sequence (ci} with the desired properties 01 
for some T > t find cttl ,..., or so that 
1 si i .< (C, + 1)5l”, I <i<T. (5) 
We begin by recoordinatizing so that 
sI = (O,..., 0, a) O<a<C,+l. 
If 1 sI / = a < CI; we may choose T = t + 1, l t., I arbitrarily and (4.5) are 
clearly satisfied. Hence we may assume 
C,<a<C,+l. (6) 
We shall use the notation (w : b), w = (~3~ ,..,, LV~) E Rk‘, b E R1 as short- 
hand for (wl ,..., IQ., b) E R”‘-‘l. For example, sI = (0 : a). Now each vi = 
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(wi : ai), wi E R”, j wi j < I, 1 ai j < 1. By induction we find l t*,1 , c&Z ,... 
such that 
Case 1. 
/ fj l i*wi 1 < Ck 
i=t+l 
for all T > t. (7) 
for all t > T. 
In this case we set .Q = Ed* for all i > t. For all T > t 
(8) 
ST = ij+l Ei*Wi : a t ,f,, ci*ai). 
Combining (6), (7), (8) 
j ST 1 ,( [c,’ + (2(c, + l))“]li2 < (c, f 1)51j2, 
as desired. 
Case 2. Case 1 is false. Then let T + 1 be theJirst integer so that 
1 y ci*ui I 1 Ck + 1. 
i=t+l 
Replacing the ei* by their negatives if necessary (a critical step) we may 
assume 
T+l 
and (7) still holds. Then 
-c, - I <I c Ei*& < PCk 
i=t+1 
(the left-hand inequality from T + 1 being the$rst integer and the right-hand 
inequality as I ~~+~a,+, I < 1). From (6), 
at i E,*ui < 1. 
i=t+1 
Now set 
Ei = Ei* t+l <i,<T. 
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We have 
and 
T  
c,wi : a -+ C ciad 
z=f+l 
satisfying (4). For f + 1 -<j < T 
sj = ( i l iwi : a + t wi). 
id+1 i-t-+1 
Now 
a+ 2 Eiai 
i=t+1 
( < / a / t 1 t ciai 1 < 2(CI, + 1) 
i=t+1 
and 
SO 
j sj / < [C,Z + (2(C, + I))“]‘;” < (C, + 1)51!Z, 
satisfying (5). Q.E.D. 
We have not attempted to find the best possible value of C, . This proof 
yields an exponential (in k) upper bound for C, and we do not know the 
correct order of magnitude for C, . 
GAME TV*. GAME IV with / . / replaced by II . /j. 
Let C,* be the value of GAME IV. Then C,* < C&1’2 by a simple 
application of (2). It appears difficult to find a direct proof that C,* is finite 
as the recoordinatization plays such a central role in the proof of Theorem 4. 
3. DISCRETE BALANCING GAMES 
We now look at variants where Player I must choose each vi from a finite 
set W. 
GAME V. Fix k, WC R1. Player I selects vi E W, Player II then selects 
ei = il. There are an infinite number of rounds. The payoff is sup I/ st //. 
THEOREM 5. If W is finite GAME V has a finite value. 
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Proof. Player II may employ the following simple strategy. For each 
w E W Player 11 selects E = +l the first time I selects w, E = -1 the 
second time, E = (- l)i+l the ith time. Then any 
where each A, = 0 or 1. Hence st assumes at most 21wI possible values so 
the payoff is bounded. 
GAME VI. Fate (Player I) sends students to Dean (Player II) who must 
place students into two dormitories, Plush and Minush. Each student has 
some subset of k possible attributes and Dean wishes the two dormitories to 
be as evenly matched as possible in each attribute. 
More formally, GAME VI is GAME V with W = {(x1 ,..., xi,.): xi = 0 or 1;. 
GAME VII. GAME V with W = {(x, ,..., x3: xi = 0, +I, or - 1). 
GAMES VI and VII have been solved by Jeff Legarias. For k > 2 the GAMES 
have values 2k‘-2 and (3kp1 + 1)/2, respectively. Independently, Imre Barany 
has proven strong results on GAME V. His results will appear in the Journal 
of Combinatorial Theory. 
